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AMERICA AND THE EUROPEAN SENSE OF HISTORY
'Rob Kroes, Amerika Instituut, University of Amsterdam
The ways in which Europeans have tried to make sense of America constitute a special
chapter in the European history of ideas. At first glance what strikes us in the bewildering
variety ofEuropean readings ofAmerica is the recurring attempt at formulating the critical
differences that set America apart from the historical experience and cultural conventions
ofEuropean nations. America is never seen as purely sui generis, as constituting an alien
entity to be fathomed in terms of an inner logic wholly its own. There is always the sense
of America being a stray member of a larger family, a descendant from Europe. If it
belongs to the genus proximum of Western civilization, the point was to define the
differentia specijica according to an almost Linnaean taxonomy. European conventions
have always served as the yardstick, implied or explicit, in European attempts at uncovering
the rules of transformation that had cut America adrift from the European mainstream.
Hardly ever, though, is this intellectual quest for the crucial difference entirely dis-
interested. Rather than merely being an academic exercise, more often than not there is an
existential urgency involved in the exploration ofthe American difference. IfEurope serves
as the standard for measuring difference, the outcome of such measurement is always
geared to a discussion of its potential impact on Europe. In other words, there is always a
triangulation going on, in the sense that the reflection on America as a counterpoint to
European conventions functions within a larger reflection on Europe's history and destiny.
If this may seem unduly to intellectualize the repertoire of European views of
America, I hasten to say that in addition to the more intellectually articulate versions there
are vernacular, or popular, versions. Widely shared and informing everyday conversations,
they may seem more like unreflected stereotypes, providing ready answers to those trying
to make sense ofthe many Americas that reach them in their daily lives through the modern
means of mass communication. Yet we should not exaggerate the difference between the
intellectual and the vemacular views of America. At both levels a similar triangulation
takes place, less articulate perhaps at the vernacular level, yet similar in so far as people
make sense of America in ways that are meaningful to their own lives. Their constructions
of America, shared with peer groups, focus on American counterpoints which then help
them develop individual and group identities different from models and standards pre-
vailing in their horne setting.
There are yet other ways in which we can explore the similarities underlying the
European views of America. If we look at them as so many narrative accounts of perceived
differences, they appear as repertoires ofmetaphors. Again, the metaphors are many, yet
a deep structure underlies them ofmuch greater simplicity. In arecent publication l I have
proposed the reduction of these repertoires to essentially three underlying dimensions
which are remarkably stable irrespective oftime, national culture, or dass. Always these
three main dimensions served to structure a discourse of cultural difference, of "Us"-
people in Europe-versus "Them"-the Americans. Of these three main dimensions one
1 Rob Kroes, Jf You 've Seen One, You 've Seen Ihe Mall: Europeans and American Mass Cu/lure.
Urbana/Chicago: University of IIIinois Press, 1996.
2is spatial, contrasting an America seen as flat, reducing European verticality, hierarchy, the
sense ofhigh versus low, of cultural heights and the feeling of depth, to purely horizontal
vectors playing themselves out on the surface, exteriorizing what to Europeans is the inner
life of the soul. The second dimension is temporal, to do with a contrast that casts
Americans as lacking the European sense of the past as a living presence. The third
dimension represents all those views that see American culture as lacking the European
sense of holism, of organic cohesion; Amerieans in this view are never loath to take the
European eultural heritage apart, dissecting it into eomponent parts and reeombining them
in total irreverenee to what has grown in historie and spatial specificity. These three
dimensions form the discursive formation of Europe's "occidentalism," the underlying
structure of meanings, as Raymond Williams called it, capable of spawning an endless
number of meaningful sentences and individual utterances ranging from the highly subtle
and nuanced to the coarsely stereotypical. Yet in spite ofall variation at the level ofexplicit
statements, it is my point that the motifs they use are resonant of repertoires that are more
widely shared among the larger public and are ofremarkable historical stability.
Two further points need making here. Often the metaphorical repertoires of
European occidentalism were used to reject America and its culture, but not always. When
European intellectuals elevated America as an example for Europeans to emulate, the same
metaphors could serve their expressions of praise. Similarly, at the vemacular level,
readings ofAmerican culture as a counterpoint to established European cultural modes have
used the same metaphorical dimensions for the representation of America, yet at the same
time the general appreciation changed from rejeetion to reception. Developments in
Cultural Studies during the last fifteen years or so have helped to shed light on the
processes of t\1e transmission and reception of popular/mass culture, and on the way that
Ameriean eulture has influeneed the proeesses of identity formation among younger
generations elsewhere. These generations, during our eentury, rather than meekly re-
producing their national eultures, or at least parental eultures as imposed on them, more
often than not seleetively appropriated American popular culture for acts of cultural
rebellion and resistance. What needs further exploration in this context is the way in which
European constructions of America were a dialectical exercise in which the real discussion
among those at the reeeiving end was about the national identity of their horne country, in
the larger context of a debate about Europe. When national elites or non-elite groups use
references to "America," or to "Europe" for that matter, we have to see them in the light of
infra-national discussions coneerning the eontours ofthe national identity, French, German,
British, and so on.
As a second point I should emphasize that for all the stability of the diseursive
formation of European views concerning Ameriea, it is like a dormant resource. Clearly in
the continuing European/American encounter some moments are more likely to trigger a
European intewretative response than others. Thus, for instance, the 1920s was not just like
any other preceding decade in the way that America forced itself upon the European
eonsciousness. In the wake ofWorld War I the United States had, literally ifnot physically,
become a presence in Europe, inducing Europeans to a renewed and urgent reflection upon
the American identity. America's intervention in the war, the presence of its armies in
Europe, the massive advent of its mass culture in following years, allow us to look at World
3War I as a watershed. The war forced Europeans to reconsider their traditions, their
economiGt social and political plight, in short their collective destinies, but they could no
longer do this without making the case of America a constituent part of their reflections.
If there are continuities in the ways that Europeans have made sense of America, history
has also known abrupt leaps in the relative distance that Europeans have felt towards
America, like floodgates opening.
In the following I propose to take this argument further and to highlight the intricate
interrelations between these distinct levels of response to the cultural difference presented
by America, but perceived and given meaning by Europeans. The way I shall do this is by
focussing on one critical period first-the Interbellum-analyzing ways in which European
intellectuals used America in their critical reflections on the plight of Europe and of their
respective nation states. I shall then change perspective, moving in time towards the post-
World War 11 period, focussing not on the elite but on the way in which America affected
non-elite groups in their sense of self and ofhistory.
The Interbellum-Anguished European intellectuals and their views of America
"I confess that in America I have wished to see more than just America. Iwanted to find
an image there of democracy itself, of its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, its
passions; Iwanted to get to know it, ifonly at least to find out what hopes or fears it holds
for us." These words from Tocqueville's preface to his Democracy in America aptly
summarize an attitude that is more generally characteristic of European observers of the
American scene. Whether their interest was cultural, political, economic, or sodal, their
observations more often than not were inspired by asense, anguished or hopeful, that
America provided Europeans with a view of what the future held in store for them. This
sense was made more acute by the intimation that not only did America offer a glimpse of
Europe's future, to be perceived by merely juxtaposing American settings to conditions in
Europe, the country was also seen as the historic agent of Europe's future. Even those
observers who in their more lucid and detached moments were willing to grant that both
the' United States and Europe were set on a parallel course of sodal and cultural
transformation, with America being further advanced along that road, often assumed that
America would already have left its typical imprint on the forms of the future before these
would reach Europe. All the more reason, then, for those of this cast of mind, to watch
American developments closely in order better to be able to fend offthe threat ofEurope's
Americanization, and to prepare strategies of cultural resistance.
Many were the voices in Europe during the interwar years calling for a defense of
Europe's cultural heritage, defined either in tenns ofnational identities or ofa larger entity
called "Europe." As I have argued elsewhere,2 the line dividing both levels ofargument was
never neat. Clearly the need for defense in the face of achallenge as massive as the one
posed by America, called for a canvass equally large: Europe. In that sense European critics
of American culture may ironically have much to thank the Americans for. If indeed the
2 • .Kroes, op.clt., 82-84.
4American challenge led them to argue their defensive case in terms of a larger construct,
called Europe, the idea of Europe and Europeanism appeared like the dialectical mirror
image oftheir views of America and reinforced the reflection by Europeans on the contours
of their own larger frame of identification and affiliation. Even so, however, if European
intellectuals did not argue their case in terms of c1early national contours, rising to the
defense of national cultures and national identities, a discourse cast in terms of national
concerns and modes of reflection was never far below the surface. Thus, various Europes
transpired in their arguments, appearing as thinly veiled versions of hallowed national
identities. While French critics of American culture and civilization elevated a view of
Europe that showed the typically French preoccupations with individual creativity and
craftmanship, German critics tended to favor a view of Europe in a more collectivist vein,
ofthe Volk seen as the carrier ofa collective Kultur.
Not only do we see how the image of "Europe" is often cast in characteristically
national terms, more generally we can say that "Europe" often served as no more than
a flimsy rhetorical veneer. More often than not it could hardly paper over the fault lines
between the various national cultures. An amusing example of this can be found in Andre
Siegfried's writings. In 1927 he wrote the preface to a study by Andre Philip about labor
conditions in America-Le probleme ouvrier aux Etats Unis. It is a study about the place
of the worker 'in an industry that had become organized around the tenets of Fordism, of
Taylorism, of standardization, of mass production, and above all of "le machinisme."
Siegfried lauds Philip as a "bon europeen" (a good European) who had set out to measure
American labor conditions by a European yardstick of humanist values. He remembers
how he hirnself had only become aware in America of "le monde europeen comme un
ensemble." (the European world as a whole). Only in America "on prend conscience
d'une realite qui nous echappe ici, c'est qu'il existe un esprit europeen, dont l'esprit
americain est souvent la parfaite antithese. "(one becomes aware of a reality that' escapes
us here, namely that a European spirit does exist, to· which the American spirit often
stands as the perfect opposite). From a moral point of view America, new as it is, has
been cut off from our twenty centuries' old traditions by the hiatus of emigration across
the ocean; it no longer shares much with the old Europe that is still in direct communion
with Rome, with Greece and even with India. Clearly up to this point Siegfried conceives
of Europe "comme un ensemble," as a integral whole. But it isn't long before he begins
to add individual detail to his picture: "Parmi les peuples europeens, le fran<;:ais est celui
qui a eu, le plus, la conscience de ce qu 'est un individu, un homme ... " (among the
European nations, the French is the one that has had the clearest sense of what it means
to be an individual, a Man... ). France clearly takes pride of place in the European
ensemble, embodying some of the core values of Europeanism. But Siegfried does not
leave it at that. He goes on to single out one other country from the European whole,
describing it as an America in Europe: Germany. "Les Allemands, si semblables atant
d'egards aux Americains modernes, se sont jetes dans la standardisation avec une sorte
de passion, comme ils font toutes choses. II n'est point d'Allemand, aujourd'hui, qui ne
chante avec conviction II hymne de la 'rationalisation'; celle-ci repond evidemment aleur
genie de discipline, avouons-Ie aussi, aleur manque de personnalite." (The Germans, so
similar in so many ways to the modern Americans, have hurled themselves on to a course
5of standardization with a kind of passion, as they always do. There is no German, today,
that does not with conviction sing the praise of 'rationalization'; the latter clearly accords
with their mind for discipline, and, let us admit it, their lack of personality). So much for
the European ensemble. 3
Unsubtle as Siegfried may have been in this passage, it is a good example of the
kind of triangulation that I am exploring. Gauging the nature of American culture with a
view to resisting it more successfully, European critics were tom between defensive
positions centering either on their national cultural setting or on a larger European frame
of reference. 'In smaller European countries like the Netherlands the latter point of
orientation may have come more naturally to the minds of critics of American culture, yet
even in their case the plight 'oftheir national culture was always at least an implied concern.
The Dutch historian Johan Huizinga may be a good case in point. For one thing, in his
reflections on America, he was never solely the historian in his Olympian role of detached
observer. He was rather a historian in the role of intellectual, aware of his public calling to
probe and make sense of historical trends as these affected the life of his contemporaries.
But also, and this is a point of direct re1evance to my argument, he was a man who
throughout his work performed a continuing triangulation. When he wrote about Dutch
culture, he explored it as a variant of European culture, trying to define its specificity.
When he evoked life in Europe on the eve of the Renaissance, he did it with a view to
producing a picture of European culture that European countries had moved away from
since under the impact of larger forces of modemization. When he wrote about America,
either as a historian or as an astute observer of its contemporary scene, he did it with
European or Dutch culture at the back ofhis mind. Finally, in his later, darker musings on
contemporary history losing fonn, America is the unnamed site where he had earlier seen
these forces of entropy at work. In the following paragraphs let me explore a litde more in
depth the uses that Huizinga made of America in what were truly reflections on the plight
ofEuropean culture in the interwar years.
Huizinga's triangulations
Upon his return from his only visit to the United States, Huizinga expressed himselfthus:
"Strange: among us Europeans who were travelling together in America ... there rose up
repeatedly this pharisaical feeling: we all have something that you lack; we admire your
strength but we do not envy you. Your instrument of civilisation and progress, your big
cities and your perfect organisation, only make us nostalgie for what is old and quiet, and
sometimes your life seems hardly to be worth living, not to speak of your future,,4-a
statement in which we hear resonating the ominous foreboding that "your future" might
3 The quotations are from Andre Siegfried's preface to: A. Philip, Le probleme ouvrier aux Etats-
Unis. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1927; xi, xv.
'1. H. Huizinga, Amerika levend en denkend: Losse opmerkingen. Haarlern: H.D. Tjeenk Willink,
1927, p.126. The translation is by Herbert H. Rowen, published as: America: A Dutch Historian's Vision,
From Afar and Near. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, p.312.
6weIl read as "our future." For indeed, what was only implied here would come out more
clearly in Huizinga's more pessimistic later writings, when America became a mere piece
ofevidence in his case against contemporary history losing form. Thus, in 1935, in his The
Shadows ofTomorrow, there is the foHowing sweeping indictment: "The number, so it was
said, washed across the individual; the mass dragged the individual along, defenceless, and
lowered hirn to a level that always was the largest common denominator ofthe more simple
and coarser features, while levelling and washing away the more complex and 'higher'
expressions ofthe individual. New regimes could stimulate these coarsening trends and use
for their own purposes such negative feelings like rancour, vengefulness and cruelty."5 Still
later, in an essay written when World War 11 already raged across Europe, he would once
again connect this more general sense of cultural decline to America: "... the modem world
is becoming more and more accustomed to thinking in numbers. America has hitherto been
more addicted to this, perhaps, than Europe....Only the number counts, only the number
expresses thought."6
Huizinga may have inveighed against an obnoxious Americanism, against an
"America" in quotation marks, yet he could not be mistaken as a mouth-piece for a vulgar
anti-Americanism. He was too subtle-minded for that, forever aware of the counter-
argument, of ambiguity; he was also too open to the real America, as an historical given,
to relinquish the mental reserve ofthe quotation mark. The Huizinga quotation from his
book oftravel observations, which already was fuH of ambivalence, continues: "And yet,
it is we that have to be the Pharisees, for theirs is the love and the confidence. Things must
be different than we think." What strikes us in this rejection ofwhat Europe was wont to
call Americanism, is the intellectual sense ofwonder, ofadmiration even, and ofan affinity
with and appreciation of that other variety of Americanism, that heritage of highminded
ideals that had inspired so much ofAmerican history. Thus, in his 1935 essay on the Dutch
cast ofmind7, he did ponder the onslaught ofominous trends ofa machine-like organization
of social and politicallife-of the mechanization of life, as he called it-trends which he
had earlier seen as typifying life in America; yet at the same time he saw a countervailing
force in Dutch virtues of tolerance and a sense of liberty which had formed the nation
around its myth of origin in a historic struggle for freedom and independence. It had set the
nation apart as a "noble part ofWestem Europe," finding its center ofgravitation across the
sea. It found its partners in the Atlantic world, where freedom was still preserved. In its
westward orientation "lay the strength and raison d 'eIre of our existence," as Huizinga saw
it.8
Yet, in Huizinga's attempts at triangulation, casting America as the pure type
representing more general forces of social transformation, we easily recognize the
repertoire of metaphors that were current among critics of American culture during the
Interbellum. If from that perspective we judge Huizinga by the company he kept, he did in
5 J.H. Huizinga, In de schaduwen van morgen (1935), Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1950;
Collected Works, Vol. VII., pp.313-424.
6 l.H. Huizinga, Over vormverandering der geschiedenis (1941), Collected Works, Vol. VII, pp.
192-207.
7 J.H. Huizinga, Nederland's geestesmerk (1935), Collected works, Vol. VII, pp. 279-313.
8 Huizinga, Geestesmerk, p. 312.
7fact use language that others put in the service of a more faciIe anti-Americanism. In the
above quotations we already have cIear examples of the metaphoric deep structure of a
European discourse casting America as the counterpoint to European cultural traditions.
When in Amei-ica Huizinga longed for "things old and quiet," the triangulation may weIl
have implied the monastic, medieval Europe that Huizinga affiliated with so strongly. In
the Europe of his time he may weIl have feit simiIarly estranged, yet there was more of a
Iiving past, a sense of connection to the forms of earlier European history, which America
could never provide. In his 1926 coIlection oftravel observations there is one such moment
of epiphany, reminiscent-ironicaIly--of Henry Adams's affiliation with the European
Middle Ages. While ranting about the banality ofthe cultural forms that Americans used
to shape their cultural consumption, Huizinga pauses to reminisce on a few hours spent in
Cologne, in between trains. Contemporary Cologne aggravated hirn. The holy city on the
Rhine had become ugly and banal (not unlike, Huizinga seems to imply, the Arnerica ofhis
day). But leaving the indifferent street life behind hirn, in the semi-darkness of a church
where mass was being celebrated, Huizinga suddenly realised what a true ritual is, what it
represents as a cultural value and a cultural form. It was like an act of communion with a
past in which these things to all were the essence of life.9
Observatiops like these, it may be cIear, we can group among a repertoire of
metaphors that aIl have to do with time, casting an America that critically lacks a sense of
thepast as the antithesis to a Europe where the present is meaningfully reiated to life in the
past.The other Huizinga remarks that we quoted above, rather ilIustrate a second
metaphorical dimension, one that contrasts Arnerica and Europe in terms of spatial images.
America is typically seen as the country eroding European cultural heights and sense of
d'epth. It typically does so by reducing quality to quantity, intrinsic value to exchange value,
individual difference to the uniformity ofnumbers. Huizinga's observation that, in Arnerica
and increasingly in the Old World as weIl, only the number is seen as capable ofexpressing
thought, is in a sense a mild form of the more pejorative European view that Arnericans
reduce everything to dollars. Other variations in this second, spatial repertoire point to the
exteriority of life in America, as a life literallyon the surface, shaIlow, lacking depth,
,devoid of the European sense of the tragic.
Huizinga's contemporary, Oswald Spengler, in his Jahre der Entscheidung, argued
along similar Iines, only with greater dramatic emphasis. Highlighting the European sense
of Tiefe (depth) and Seele (soul), as weIl as the element of true historical tragedy, he
actually merged two metaphorical dimensions, the spatial and the temporal, into one: he
connects the shallowness of life in Arnerica to its lacking a sense of true historical tragedy.
Others, following a later worId war, would have a similar hunch. Albert Camus, following
his 1946 visit to the United States, had this observation: "The afternoon with students. They
don't feel the real problem; however their nostalgia is evident. In this country where
everything is done to prove that lire isn't tragic, they feel something is missing. The great
effort is pathetic, but one must reject the tragic after having looked at it, not before."tO Jean-
Paul Sartre at about the same time had similar observations on the absence ofa tragic sense
9 Huizinga, Amerika levend en denkend, p. 165/6.
10 Albert Camus, American Journals. London: Sphere Books, 1990; p.42.
8oflife in America. The country, for all its blithe optimism, struck hirn as tragic in a rather
pathetic way, due precisely to this absence.In his early postwar study ofEuropean views
of America, Andre Visson, an expatriate Frenchman, already commented on the ironies of
this peculiar complaint by European intellectuals. There is indeed astrange psychological
mechanism at work among European intellectuals who tend to pride themselves on their
tragic sense of life rather than admitting to feelings of collective guilt about Europe's
suicidal orgies in two world wars. They tumed feelings of envy and inferiority towards
America, as the country that had twice saved Europe from its worst excesses, into a sense
of intellectual superiority. The contrast indeed between the splendor of life in a victorious
America and the miseries of warn-tom Europe may have been too much to confront
directly. Only rarely do we come across an unmediated expression ofthis contrast. Camus
comes elose to putting it into words: " ... I am literally stupefied by the circus oflights. I am
just coming out offive years ofnight, and this orgy ofviolent lights gives me for the first
time the impression ofa new continent. An enormous, 50-foot-high Camel billboard: a G.I.
with his mouth wide open blows enormous puffs of real smoke." According to Visson,
Sartre like many other European intellectuals seems convinced that Americans are
fundamentally unhappy. Sartre-and Visson quotes hirn-met Americans who, "though
conventionally happy, suffer from an obscure malaise to which no name can be given, who
are tragic through fear of being so, through that local absence of the tragic in them and
around them."11 But elearly, the perception of Americans as a people essentially unhappy,
because unable to rise above their collective mad dash for happiness, is as old as
Tocqueville's observations on 'the sentiments of Americans.' Equally elearly, it is an
ineradicable habit among observers of cultural difference to translate their experience of
outsidershi~afterall: they are the outsiders trying to look in-into the language of quasi-
inside reports. Small wonder, then, that never having been on the inside, they tend to report
on voids and absences. Never having probed much beyond the surface, all they find worth
mentioning is that the "other" culture has nothing but surface to offer. In all such cases,
observationsfrom the outside are not more than observations ofthe outside.
At times Huizinga seemed aware of the metaphorical quality of his exercise in
measuring the difference between America and Europe along dimensions of polar
opposites. Thus, in the diary he kept while traveling in the Unites States, published
posthumously, there is this observation, made almost literally in passing: "In the moming
from Philadelphia to Baltimore. The landscape has something light, something ingenu, sans
eonsequenee, lacking depth, as if one dimension were missing.(! sie) At times everything
here makes that impression. As if, orbiting in a sphere around the essence of things, one is
suddenly moved out to a more distant, wider sphere, at higher speed but more remote."
Simply watching alandscape from a train, he must have become aware of the deeper logic
underlying his attempts at ordering his observations of critical differences and contrasts
between Amenca and Europe. Otherwise his hunch that in American landscapes a vertical
dimension is missing, when taken literally, does not make much sense. Yet he was never
fully aware of the full range of dimensions he used in making sense of the American
difference.
11 A. Visson, As Others See Uso Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948; p. 149.
9So far, we have recognised two dimensions in Huizinga's order of observations, the
spatial and the temporal. These two may weIl be the ones most commonly found in
European constructions of America, triggered more in the way that stereotypes are, like
ready-made categories of observation and interpretation. They are, as we argued above, an
indication more of the facHe leap of outsiders who try to pose as vicarious insiders than the
result of any imaginative attempt at interpreting differences in terms ofthe inner logic of
the other society, the one under intrigued scrutiny. Things may weIl be different with the
third dimension ofmetaphors, conceiving of America as lacking the European sense ofthe
organic cohesion of cultural forms and styles. Not only do Americans tend to discard the
established European hierarchies, ranking cultural forms in terms ofhigh versus low, and
do they irreverently recycle the European repertoires, blurring high culture and mass
culture, in their production, distribution, and appreciation or consumption of culture. Also,
at every level, .whether in the adoption by Americans of European forms and styles of high
art, or in more technical areas ofproduction for the market, a spirit of blithe and irreverent
bricolage is at work, which does not shrink from taking things apart and putting them
together again in different forms, put to different purposes.
Huizinga may have been at his most astute in exploring this difference in the mental
and cultural habitus of the Americans. At times his appreciation of the difference could be
highly positive, as in his attempts at accounting for the radically American nature ofauthors
he liked, such as Emerson and Whitman. They had, he argued, to differ from European
standards; there was no way they could hope to riyal European authors by trying to emulate
the artistic forms developed in Europe. These forms had grown in Europe, in temporal and
spatial specifity, and could be of no use for an expression of American thought and
creativity. Formlessness was what innovating American authors had to experiment with.
At other moments, though, similar perceptions led Huizinga to make more critical
judgments inspired by an over-all sense of a cultural degeneration and loss in America of
things valued highly in Europe. Particularly in his more anguished perceptions, of course,
Huizinga was ~ever solely the detached observer. Europe was always foremost on his mind,
as the cultural domain likely to be tainted by trends observed in America.
These concerns were more central to his second than to his first book about
America. Examples abound. American journalism, for instance, typified this fragmenting
approach to the news, cutting its meaningful links to a larger history unfolding. The
fragmenting of the news, the separation of current events from their historical context, the
reduction of the news to, as Huizinga put it, "Slogan, the brief, catchy phrase," all
constituted, as he saw it, "a regression of culture." They all resulted from America's being
a mass democracy and would therefore, in due course, come to other mass democracies as
weIl, a case, clearly, of parallel developments, with Europe following closely on the heels
of America. Yet, interestingly, Huizinga also connected these trends, as observed in
America, to a strictly American background factor, the "anti-metaphysical cast ofmind"
in America. This mentality was the lasting heritage of an Enlightenment rationalism that
had more firmly entrenched itself in America than anywhere else. "Do we not feel as if
placed back in the eighteenth century?," Huizinga wondered. And, he continued, "the anti-
metaphysical cast of mind naturally implies an anti-historical one. In spite of a flourishing
and superbly organized practice ofhistory [as an academic endeavor] America's mind is
10
thoroughly anti-historical. A historiography that in the march ofhumankind wants to see
purely the theodicee of progress, is not the true kind." Or, as he put it elsewhere, the
American is directed towards the present and the future too much to be open to the mystery
of the past. 12
Whoever lives totally in the present, has no sense ofhistoric meaning and context.
Nor will such a person have a sense of organic cohesion. For indeed, anything that can be
conceived in terms of internal coherence has a historical dimension, or, shall we say, a
historicist specificity in its configuration of constituent elements. As a general theme it can
be taken as indicative of the third metaphorical repertoire used by Europeans to give
expression to American cultural defects, as they saw them. Once again Huizinga provides
us with a telling example. When introduced to the Dewey Decimal System, the system for
the systematic filing of library holdings as recently adopted in America, he recognized a
quintessentially American impulse at work. As he saw it, time and time again living organic
connections in the body of human knowledge were sacrificed to the need for classification.
The human mind had been made subservient to the tyranny of the decimal system. It
confirmed his intimations concerning the anti-metaphysical bent ofthe Americans and their
inclination toward subjecting the spiritual realm to the dictates of technical organization. 13
Clearly, then, in his attempts at making sense of America as a cultural counterpoint to
Europe Huizinga used the repertoire of Europe's language of "occidentalism." His
reflections were geared in part toward gauging the inner logic, the cultural modus operandi,
ofa civilization intriguingly at odds with European conventions and habits ofmind. Yet his
more central concern, particularly in his later writings, was with the portent ofhis reading
of American culture for Europe's destiny. Typically, in his musings on American
civilization we see Huizinga taking this larger view. He perceives in America the first
signs of a process of civilization that is much more general in portent: "Organization
becomes mechanization; that is the fatal moment of the modern history of civilization. ,,14
His broader view, however, does not make his mood of cultural demise any less acute.
Yet he is aware that without mechanization there will be no civilization at all: "The
process of refining culture is inseparable from that of instrumentalization." The process,
however, has two distinct effects; it has a power-to-bind and a power-to-liberate. And it
would appear ("taking America as the most perfect example") as if the balance tends too
much towards. the first, toward the subservience and bondedness of the individual, rather
than towards setting him free. Huizinga goes on to ponder the possibility of whether the
instrumentalization of life in America might not work out differently than in Europe:
"Organization in the sense of standardization means the establishing of a uniform and
well-defined technical nomenc1ature ... to the American it constitutes not only an
individual need rather than a necessary evil, it also constitutes a cultural ideal ...
12 Huizinga, 1927, p.175.
11nterestingly, this observation is from Huizinga's first book on America: Mensch en menigte in
Amerika. Collected Works, p.332/3 ..
14 For Huizinga's views on the mechanisation of contemporary Iife, see his Mensch en menigte in
Amerika (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1918), chapter II, and his Denkend Mensch en Menigte (Haarlem: Tjeenk
Willink, 1927), pp.14 ff.
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Everyone familiar with their sense of conformity and collective identity will realize this.
The American wants to be equal to his neighbor. He feels spiritually safe only in the
normatively ordained, not to mention the fact that the latter also implies 'efficiency'."
Typically, Huizinga is wavering here between two modes of interpretation. We recognize
the distancing strategy when he tries to link the more ominous implications of the trend
towards mechanization to character traits that he deerns typically American. Yet at the same
time he reminds the reader that he is taking America "as the most perfect example,"
implying that his cultural critique applies more generally.
There is a similar ambivalence in Huizinga' s reading ofanother ominous cultural
trend perceived in America, yet again ofmore general portent: the shift away from a culture
centering on the word towards one centering on the image. Huizinga' s views on firn are
a good case in point. They reflect the mixed feelings he had about America. At one point
in his 1927 collection of travel impressions he went so far as to accept film as an art
form, for which a new Muse or patron saint would have to be found. But he instantly
qualified this position, pointing out that the "Movies"-as he put it in his Dutch text-are
a mere illustration, albeit the most important, of an ominous shift in our
civilization-away from reading to watching, away from the printed word toward
"ideographic" information. Yet again Huizinga was ambivalent. Pondering the impact of
film as he had witnessed it in America, he was awareof its democratic potential. Film
was Whitmanesque in its capacity to restore a democratic vista, allowing people a
comprehensive, if vicarious view of the variety of life in their society. Yet, at the same
time, Huizinga' s more pessimistic views of the mechanization of contemporary culture
qualified these high hopes. As one of the new mass media, film, like radio, aimed at a
mass audience, catering to its average taste. Film tended to simplify and stereotype its
message. It might widen people's views of society, but only spuriously so, through a
flattening of the social and culturallandscape. "[Film] habituates the nation from high to
low to one common view of life. Due to its limited means of expression, its highlighting
of what is external, and the need to appeal to a general audience, film shuts off entire
areas of spiritual activity. It imposes a limited number of standard views of life that will
eventually become the mass view. ,,15 Thus, film was one of the contemporary forces of
cultural erosion that were at work in America. As an art form, visual though it might be,
it would never create lasting, self-contained forms, like sculpture or painting. In its
narrative flow film, to him, was more like literature or drama. Yet again, geared as film
was to a mass market, like radio, it could catch the attention of its audience compellingly,
yet only transiently, for fleeting moments. Unlike drama or literature, it could never
cause the audience topause and reflect.
Yet, mixed as Huizinga's feelings about film may have been, he managed astutely
to define the inner force of a medium in a way that inspires the critical reflection upon
filin until the present day. Even today the academic study of film is centrally involved
with the intriguing exchange between the imaginary world of the silver screen and the
sense of identity of the individuals watching it. A process of identification with the
shadows on the screen occurs that leads the audience to step outside itself. Huizinga made
15 Huizinga, 1927, p.28.
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the following, perceptive observation: "[Film] shows the urban dweller country life, or
at least an image of it, it shows the countryman urban life, it gives the poor a view of
luxury and the rich one of misery, all highly stylized so as to make it easy to appropriate.
Thus film rather works to conciliate than to sharpen class resentment. The repeated
illusion of the life of the rich affords the poor a certain communion with luxury and
refinement; its fantasy image becomes apart of their daily existence. In the hero the
audience exalts itself, and, beyond this, film stars off the screen offer it a new model for
emulation, a novel assurance of options open to everyone ... ,,16
Interestingly, in these musings conceming film as one modem medium for the
mechanical reproduction of culture, and as such an illustration of the wider trend of the
mechanization ofcontemporary civilization, we see Huizinga perceiving a tension between
the promise ofa democratic art and its fake realization as mass culture. Not only is he tom
between two modes of appreciation of American culture, or two forms ofAmericanism we
might say, capable of experimenting with new forms of a democratic culture, while at the
same time subverting them through a subservience to the dictates of a mass market for
cultural consumption. He also, in passages like these on film, shows an awareness of the
media of transmission of American cultural influences to audiences elsewhere. It is one
thing to declare in writing that America holds forth an image ofEurope's future, as so many
ofHuizinga's fellow critics of America's culture argued, it is quite a different intellectual
challenge actually to explore the ways in which these dismal trends would be transmitted
to Europe.
Huizinga had a keen and open eye for the ways in which the early forms of
American mass culture worked to produce virtual phantasy worlds. In addition to film he
was aware of the role that advertising began to play in the 1920s. In his travel notes, which
would be the basis for his 1926 collection of essays, there is this observation from the
streets of Chicago: "Looked at the advertisements. Rosy-cheeked boy with a smile and
three packets of cereal: For that million dollar boy ofyours. Puffed wheat.-Speculation
on the love for children, health and the sense of dollars.-The advertisements, taken
together, very clearly show an ideal, an ideal of no great reach. -Girls being offered a
camel by an enamored boy, surf-riding girls with sun blisters. The girl on the telephone.
Remember! Keep that schoolgirl complexion. Palmolive. Always the half-sentimental type,
presented as pure and healthy, a variation and refinement of what Ch. Oana Gibson
launched thirty years ago. The public constantly sees a model of refinement far beyond
their purse, ken and heart. Does it imitate this? Does it adapt itself to this?"17 Apposite
questions indeed. As in his reflections on processes of identification among film audiences,
Huizinga again is aware ofthe problem ofreception ofthe virtual worlds constantly spued
forth by a relentless commercial mass culture. More generally, in these musings, Huizinga
touched on the problem of the effect that media of cultural transmission, like film and
advertising, would have on audiences not just in America but elsewhere as weIl. In these
more general terms, the problem then becomes one of the way in which non-American
16 Huizinga, 1927, p.28.
17J. Huizinga, Amerika Dagboek: /4 April-/9 June, /926. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Contact, 1993;
p.93.
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audiences would read the phantasy worlds that an American imagination had produced and
which showed all the characteristics of an American way with culture so vehemently
indicted by European critics.
In conclusion to this section, let me point out one cruel irony. Ifin his later writings
Huizinga would dweIl on the problem of contemporary history changing, if not actually
losing, form, under the combined impact of forces of mechanization, industrialization, and
the advent of mass society, he may, in spite of his sophistication and open-mindedness,
have missed one crucial way in which people's sense ofhistory was changing. Under the
impact of precisely those media ofmass communication that Huizinga had subtly explored,
rather than ignoring or rejecting them out ofhand, his contemporaries were beginning to
fumish their historical imaginations with the ingredients of virtual phantasy worlds rather
than the stuff that history used to be made of. What to Huizinga and other like-minded
intellectuals may have been a mere epiphenomenon, hiding real historical forces from view,
would provide the markers of history to generations growing up in the second half of our
century.
American mass culture and our changing sense of history
Three vignettes to set the stage for our discussion. All three are taken from European films.
Each represents a formative moment, if not an epiphany, in the lives of the films'
protagonists. In each, it is America that provides the ingredients of these moments of
revelation. Dramatically, these moments serve as epic concentrations, condensing into a
single moment what normally is a continuing process of identity formation. The first
example is from Jacques Tati's 1949 film, Jour defite, the second from Alan Parker's The
Commitments, released in 199?, and the third from Bemard Tavemier's Round about
Midnight. which came out in 199?
In Jour de fite Tati satirized the modem obsession with speed, presenting it as a
peculiarly American obsession, but one which was highly contagious. In later work, like
Mon oncle, he would satirize other American infatuations, like the love of gadgets, labor-
saving devices, automation and remote control. There he would show it as it had already
invaded France, providing French appetites for a life of ostentation and invidious
distinction with the snob value of American contraptions. Interestingly, in his Jour defite,
he would show us the moment of contagion. The protagonist of the film, a French
provincial postman, at one point is shown peeking through a crevice in the canvass of a big
tent. Inside a film is shown dealing with speedy American postal techniques involving
virtuoso time-saving feats. The feats themselves are satirically transformed into nonsensical
dare-devil acts of motorized mail delivery men jumping through hoops of fire, and of
airplanes dropping mailbags which are picked up by postmen on motorbikes driving at full
speed. Never mind. Many of the propaganda films shown in Europe under Marshall aid
auspices and meant to instill a sense of American efficiency in the minds of Europeans,
may weIl have been perceived and remembered as equally fantastic. In fact, what we see
we see vicariously, as if through the eyes ofour astounded postman. The images shown to
us may weIl be the product ofhis eager imagination rather than conveying anything in the
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actual documentary film. Later hilarious sequences then show the way in which Tati's
postman has creatively adopted the American model, adapting his bicycle delivery act,
while experiencing a new mail (male?) identity.
The other two film vignettes are variations on this theme of Europeans looking in
from the outside, undergoing a culture shock, while experiencing it as a moment of
conversion. In Bertrand Tavernier's film it is the encounter of a young Frenchman with
American jazz in the late 1940s. Unable to afford the price of admission to a Paris jazz club
where one ofhis cultural heroes is playing, we see hirn hunched outside a window, 1iterally
eavesdropping on a world of meaningful sounds, coded messages from an enticing, but far-
away culture. As it happens, he manages to get in touch with the revered musician,
recasting his own life into a mission of support and protection of the drug-ravaged career
ofhis tragic hero. In Alan Parker's The Commitmentsanother musical encounter makes for
a moment of epiphany. A group ofpoor Irish boys watches James Brown on television do
his archetypal primal scream. When the show is over the leader of this small group instantly
translates the experience into terms relevant to the lives they lead in Ireland. "We have to
become like hirn. He is like uso The Irish are the blacks of Europe, and we in our
neighborhood are the blacks ofDublin. Black is beautiful." In disbeliefhis friends silently
repeat the last words, their lips moving to form the words of the punch line. Black is
beautiful. Slowly the message sinks in. Yet another appropriation of American culture has
taken place, affecting the sense of identity of these youngsters. They are cast in the role of
celebrants in a ritual of cultural conversion.
These moments of voluntary affiliation with American life styles and cultural
models are a· recurring feature of postwar European cultural production, in film, on
television, and in literature. The three examples that I gave should be seen as only a sampie
ofthis larger body. A more comprehensive study would be ofinterest for two reasons. They
would give us a sense of the many settings in which these critical encounters with
American culture took place. They are like moments of remembrance as everyone growing
up in postwar Europe will have them. They are the condensed memorable versions ofthe
more continuing exposure to American culture that Europeans have all experienced. When
taken together they are like an album ofvignettes vividly illustrating the ongoing process
not only. of the forms of reception of American culture, but also of its selective
appropriation, which is to say of the ways in which American culture was redefined and
made to serve the cultural needs of Europeans. Settings of reception then become the
crucial focus for analysis. They could have been defined by age, by class, by gender, by
ethnicity.
Whatever the precise setting, it was always a matter of people finding themse1ves
relatively at the margin of establishedmainstream cultural modes and molds, people who
were not, or not yet, fully integrated into these dominant conventional forms. American
culture, as they read it, provided them with alternatives of non-conventionality, informality,
and a sense of freedom ofchoice, all in marked contrast to cultural conventions they were
expected to make their own.
Ifthis would be one reason to create our album ofvignettes, there is a second one.
In cultural studies the exploration of the process of reception, or of cultural consumption,
is a nut devilishly hard to crack. Whatever area of mass cultural production one takes,
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whether it is world's fairs, film, television soap operas, or literary forms like the romance,
we are always dealing with mass audiences consuming these products. It is one thing to
explore the programmatic strategies of the organizers and producers of such forms of mass
culture, it is a totally different thing actually to gauge what the audience chooses to get out
of them. Interesting response studies have been done in these areas, such as of housewives
watching soaps, or ofreaders reading romances. But the larger the issue becomes, as in the
case ofthe European postwar reception of American mass culture, the more formidable are
the problems of how to study the process of reception. That is where a study of vignettes
as I have suggested them above might playa role.
After all, as narrative moments in stories told by Europeans, they are like second-
order evidence ofthe reception ofAmerican culture. They tell stories ofreception. They are
recycled, or reconstructed, moments meant to convey remembrances of critical cultural
encounters. Irr that sense they are explicit indications of a process of reception. As such
they are more open to research than questions of first-order reception. It is harder to see
someone eating a Hamburger in Paris as making a cultural statement, expressing an identity
challenging established conventions, than it would be to interpret a narrative passage, in a
film or a book, presenting Hamburger consumption in precisely the light of a cultural
peripety. Or, for that matter, it would be harder to find proof of a direct, first-order
American influence in Alan Parker's style of film-making than it would be to trace his
awareness ofsuch influences taking place. After aIl, he turns them into the stuffofnarration
hirnself. This much may be clear, then: if moments of the reception of American culture,
presented in the dramatic light of moments of epiphany, have become a recurrent feature
of European story-telling, they testify to a degree of self-conscious awareness of the
American cultural impact which it would be unwise to neglecL
Condensed into single moments, points in time serving as lieux de memoire, to use Pierre
Nora's felicitous phrase, all vignettes of the reception of American culture in Europe
highlight what has truly been an ongoing process. Whatever conversion moments
Europeans may vividly remember, they have all been more continuously exposed to an
environment of free-floating cultural signifiers made in America. Confronted with an
ongoing stream ofvistas ofthe good life, as carried by media such as film, advertisements,
television, music videos, they have walked through a duplicate world of images as a
continuing accompaniment to their lives. They never walked alone. Highly private as the
consumption of American culture may have been, eavesdropping on AFN broadcasts late
at night and against parental wishes, watching a movie with a significant other, shutting out
one's environment through the use ofa Walkman, yet the cultural products that made for
such private moments were atthe same time consumed by many others, constituting a mass
audience. These private moments, then, may weIl be seen as forms of collective behavior
typical ofcontemporary mass societies. The very fact that the private consumption of mass
culture is necessarily shared with many others gives mass culture its paradoxical quality of
setting the public stage, geving an era its particular cultural flavor. Reminiscing, individual
people become aware that they share similar cultural memories with others. They are able
to reconstruct the feel of years past, evoking moments of cultural consumption that it turns
they shared with others. Everyone knows the exhilarating moments discovering that others
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enjoyed the same film or rock song one thought one had enjoyed privately. There is the
sudden sense of ajoint return to a past that briefly comes to life again.
In that'sense modern mass culture, much of it in an American mold, has given our
sense of history a particular coating. If Huizinga bemoaned the fact that history as he
conceived of it was losing form, and escaped his capacity to recognize patterns of
coherence and meaning, he must have been unaware of contemporary mass culture giving
our sense ofhistory this new coat. As a shared repertoire of recollections, allowing people
to call forth an image of "the fifties" or the "the sixties," the mass cultural mold of an era
is certainly a new form that history has assumed. It serves people as a switch that allows
them to connect private memories with public memories. More importantly, as in neural
networks, such recollections often connect to historical events of a more traditional nature.
We all remember such events through the images that the mass media brought right to our .
hornes, like newspaper photographs, or television news flashes. Many of such images gain
an iconic status, recapitulating an event in ways that leave an indelible imprint in our
minds, as if on an etcher's plate. Often such images start leading their own lives. They pop
up time and time again, as in the case ofNick Dt's photograph ofnapalmed Vietnamese
children running in terror towards the eye of his camera. Many vividly remembered the
photograph, when in the Fall of 1996, on veteran's day its reading suddenly changed. The
girl in the photograph re-appeared on the stage of history as a woman of flesh and blood,
individualized, no longer solely an icon. On Veteran's Day she came to a ritual of
remembrance at the Vietnam War monument in Washington, DC, offering forgiveness. 18
A new meaning was added to an icon of mass culture that had long allowed us to give
shape and form to our understanding ofthe Vietnam War.
There are more general ways, though, in which the coat of mass cultural memory
is used to recreate the past. They are ways similar to the recycling of the process of the
reception of American mass culture into individual vignettes into single moments of
conversion. They are like a second-order, conscious use ofthe mass-cultural coat ofhistory
for the reconstruction of historical events. Again, the Vietnam War may offer apposite
illustrations ofwhat I have in mind. Clearly, Vietnam War movies in their own right are
mass-cultural products adding to the sediment that mass culture leaves on our sense of
history. Trying to evoke images of the Vietnam War, we often do so with the help of
Hollywood's attempts at rendering the war. Nor does Hollywood shrink from adding iconic
heroes to our store ofrecollections, for instance in the form ofRambo as a latter-day raging
Roland. Yet the very way in which many of these films go about taking us back to the
historical event is through the use ofcollectively remembered mass-cultural products ofthe
era. The music ofthe Rolling Stones and the Doors in Francis Ford Coppola's Apocalypse
Now trigger historical connections in the minds of contemporary audiences. Barry
Levinson, in his Good Morning, Vietnam, made this connecting strategy the central ploy
of his narrative. The high point of his film, of a wellnigh transcendent force, is his
combined use of various tools from the realm of mass culture. In a sequence following
Robin Williams's announcement ofjust another song in his radio program for the American
18 See the report by Jan Scruggs, "A child ofwar forgives ... ," New York Times, November 11,
1996.
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forces in Vietnam, we hear the voice of Louis Armstrong singing "What a wonderful
world." Accompanying the lyrics there is ajumble ofimages as any prime-time television
news from Vietnam would show these. The structurallogic ofthe sequence is similar to the
standard music video, and ironically, the clip from the film was popular as such, following
the release ofthe film. Merging the evocative force of Armstrong's voice with the logic of
television footage into something which clearly appeals to our familiarity with music
videos, Levinson manage to use all these mass-cultural triggers to produce a moment of
transcendence; a bitter comment on the horror ofthe war. It makes us sit back and reflect,
in spite of what prewar critics of American mass culture had argued in their mood of
cultural pessimism.
Were these critics alive today, what would they have to say to these new forms that
now playa role in shaping our sense ofthe past? Many undoubtedly would have seen it as
the ultimate victory of a cultural inversion they had been thefirst to see as typically
American, an inversion that replaces reality with its fake representations. From Georges
Duhamel and Simone de Beauvoir to more recent observers of American culture like Jean
Baudrillard and Umberto Eco the language may have changed from the straightforward
invective to more esoteric formulae like simulacrum or hyperreality, the diagnosis remains
essentially the same. They all come up with their own variations on the old Mandan theme
offalse consciousness. A man like Huizinga too might have been reluctant to see present-
day forms of historical awareness as worthy replaeements of the historiographie forms
whose decline and ultimate demise he observed or foresaw. Yet he may have eome dosest
to an historiographie perspeetive that has been gaining adherenee in reeent deeades. His
almost soeiologieal sense of the role and funetion of rituals, eeremonies, and publie
spectacles in late medieval Europe, his keen sense also ofthe role that modem mass media
played in providing frameworks for identification and self-definition to mass audiences,
took hirn to the threshold of an epistemological seaehange in the historiography of
eolleetive eonseiousness. Huizinga would have had no quarrel with a eurrent relativism that
sees eolleetive identities, ofnations, of ethnic groups, of regional eultures, as just so many
eonstructions. Precisely the invented rituals of eelebrating and memorializing sueh
identities he would have reeognized as dramatie forms of history that he hirnself had
studied. Yet he may have disagreed as to the implied voluntarism ofthis perspective and
its attribution of historie ageney. In Huizinga's case in faet the ageney rested with
historians. It was they who shaped history into larger narrative forms. Mueh eurrent
historiography, however, plaees the agency in history itself and explores it in terms of
group strategies, struggles for eultural hegemony, and the invention ofrituals meant to rally
people around strategie readlngs of their eolleetive identity.
This takes us baek to a problem I raised earlier. Exploring the strategic ageney
behind the formation ofgroup identities and frameworks for identification is one thing. But
there is always the further question as to why, at the level of individual reeeption and
appropriation ofthe riyal eonstruetions, people opt for partieular readings oftheir eolleetive
identity. How do we explore the meanings and signifieanee, at the point of reeeption, of
sueh riyal appeals? What messages and representations ofreality do people store and digest
to render meaningfullife histories? As I argued before, the mass eultural setting of our
eontemporary life is a powernd ingredient in these individual eonstruetions. Yet at the same
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time, as a setting that individuals have shared with countless others, it also provides them
with a language of remembrance that they share with others. If, to quote Carl Becker,
everyone is his own historian, we have to go down to the level of individual historical
awareness and try to fathom the sense of meaningful history at that level. It may be highly
private, yet at the same time as a private construction it draws on repertoires widely shared
with contemporaries.
If this offers achallenge to historians today, it is eagerly taken on. When, for
instance, historians are involved in the production of television documentaries about
historie episodes they consciously draw on the repertoires of mass culture produced at the
time. Thus, in the celebrated PBSIBBC series on the Great Depression, historic footage of
farmers losing their farms is followed by a clip of Betty Boop, with the narrator reminding
us: "Even Betty Boop lost her farm." The soundtrack sets the tone for recollection playing
the iconic musical reflection of the mood of the time: "Brother, can you spare a dime?"
Other footage shows us Busby Berkeley choreographies, such as the celebrated "Remember
my forgotten man." Not only do these ingredients take us back to mass culture popular at
the time, more specifically it makes us aware that mass culture at its best is able to reflect
the pressing concerns of aperiod. There are many more instances of this increased
awareness among historians of the masscultural forms of history. In search of audiences
that want to see their personal histories displayed, books, special exhibits, and, yes, entire
museums are now devoted to the everyday lives ofcOlnmon people, showing the advent of
mass cultural products into their hornes, work, leisure time pursuits, and so on. If rnass
culture has provided people with the rituals and ceremonies for the celebration of their
collective identities, its time has now come to be celebrated in its own right.
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